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Abstract
I investigate impacts to the nursing occupation from a perspective of market
concentration. I measure the concentration of healthcare employment opportunities across the
U.S. with a Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, finding moderate levels of concentration that vary
greatly in markets with different population sizes and different locations. I use a Weighted Least
Squares model to investigate how changing market concentration is affecting nurse employment.
Analysis across different regions and different levels of urbanicity finds statistically insignificant
heterogeneous effects with noisy zero estimates. The results are inconclusive evidence against
monopsony presence in the nursing labor market.
Introduction
Research question
Markets have imperfections and almost no real-world market can fully satisfy the
qualifications of perfect competition. This is especially true in the healthcare market where there
is severe asymmetry of information and product differentiation. These imperfections in the
healthcare industry pose unique questions about how to best support functionality and efficiency
in the market.
The healthcare industry has been characterized by increasing market concentration which has
gained interest from antitrust authorities beginning in the 1970s. 2 A common concern within the
healthcare labor market is a shortage of nurses which causes poor quality of care, leading some
states to mandate minimum staffing requirements in an effort to combat the shortage. 3 Lots of
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Martin Gaynor and William Vogt, “Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets,” NBER Working Paper
Series 7112 (May 1999): 2.
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Elizabeth Munnich, “The Labor Market Effects of California’s Minimum Nurse Staffing Law,” Health Economics
23, 935 (June 2013): 1.
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attention has been paid to investigate nursing shortages, looking into the causes of the shortage,
the impact on the nurses currently in the workforce, and strategies to combat the shortage. 4,5,6
Economically, it is interesting to question why the market is failing to provide adequate
nursing labor. A common suspect for labor shortages, especially in the nursing labor market, is
high market concentration and subsequent monopsony power. If there are few employers in the
market, workers become inelastic in their employment options and a monopsonist employer can
take advantage of the vulnerability. With inelastic labor supply, a monopsonist employer can
decrease wages and lower the level of employment without suffering the consequences seen in a
perfectly competitive market.
Healthcare industry analysts estimate that from 2013 to 2017 nearly one in every five
hospitals in the US was acquired or merged with another facility. 7 With increasing merger
activity historically and more recently,8 high concentration is a potential cause that could be
keeping nurse employment down.
The research question is therefore two-fold. First, I am interested in measuring the level of
concentration of nursing employment opportunities, across different geographic labor markets.
Second, I use this measure of market concentration to investigate how changing industry
organization affects employment. My hypothesis is in line with past literature and the
monopsony model: the healthcare labor market experiences high and rising market
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concentration, which yields market power for employers which in turn lowers the level of
employment in the market.
Background and Literature Review
The nursing occupation is regulated by the Board for Registered Nurses, which approves
nursing programs to certify Registered Nurses. Requiring a Registered Nursing certificate as a
qualification for employment sets minimum standards of nursing care, but also creates some
level of homogeneity of skills in the market. There is not a lot of differentiation between
registered nurses from the perspective of the employer. Moreover, at least 60% of all Registered
Nurses work at hospitals, making the hospital industry the primary employer for the occupation. 9
Limited worker differentiation and a single, prominent employer cause the labor market for
nurses to be used frequently as a textbook example of monopsony.
Leading labor economist Alan Manning describes the key idea of labor market power to
be “that the labor supply curve to an individual employer is not infinitely elastic.” 10 This means
that employers have the ability to reduce wages by some amount and not immediately lose their
employees to competitors, as would be predicted in perfect competition. In general, monopsony
power can lead to lower wages and worse working conditions. Monopsony research has
important implications for policy makers, especially involving minimum wage, antitrust, and
income inequality. In the healthcare industry, monopsony power can lead to the exploitation of
nurses. Understaffed and overworked nurses would mean patient conditions are not monitored

9

United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics. Available from
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes291141.htm
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Alan Manning, “Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Review,” ILR Review (2020): 1.
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as closely, response times fall, and quality of care diminishes as nurses become overwhelmed.
Research has found a strong association between nurse burnout and lower quality of care. 11
The literature on market concentration in healthcare labor markets primarily focuses on the
effect of market consolidation on wage growth. Particular interest is paid to examining hospital
mergers, with a common finding of increasing horizontal and vertical integration, especially with
for-profit institutions.12 The effects of increased market power from mergers likely doesn’t
differ between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, however. There is no evidence that nonprofits are more likely to provide charity service than other hospitals after an increase in market
power.13 Investigating the nature and severity of market concentration opens a window to
explore how changes to industry organization are connected to outcomes of workers in the
market and patient care.14 The results of these investigations typically find evidence that
increasing consolidation has negative effects on wages, wage growth, employment, and quality
of work.15 Labor market power is a common culprit for suppressed wage growth following large
increases in market concentration, especially in markets where workers’ skills are specific or
homogenous, such as the market for Registered Nurses. 16
A common theme throughout the literature on the nursing occupation is nursing shortages.
The original motivation for the present paper came from investigating the effects of minimum
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staffing legislation in California passed in 2004 to combat apparent nursing shortages and falling
standards of patient care in the 1990s. Nursing shortages are of valid concern for obvious
reasons; understaffed nurses mean each patient gets less attention.
The causes for the apparent shortage of nurses are usually attributed to increasing demand for
nursing care due to a growing population and the especially large and aging baby boomer’s
generation. Overall, per-capita nurse employment has declined. 17 The nursing workforce itself
is aging. The average age of Registered Nurses was 42 in 2001. 18 By 2010, over 40% of
Registered Nurses were over 50 years old. 19 Not only is there an inadequate number of nurses,
but also inadequate numbers of nurse educators to help train the next generation of nurses. 20 Not
enough new nurses are gaining the education and training required to replace the nurses who are
approaching retirement. Problems within the nursing occupation are frequently attributed to this
nursing ‘shortage,’ and are accompanied with calls for more legislative and fiscal support for
nurses. However, classic economic theory would predict increasing wages in response to a
shortage of workers in order to attract more labor and raise the level of employment in the
market to meet demand. The fact that there are prolonged and recurring problems relating to
shortages within the nursing occupation probably indicates there are more constraints to the
market than a traditional labor shortage. I investigate the nursing occupation from a perspective
of market concentration.
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Further exploration into more nuanced effects of concentration in the healthcare labor
market unveils potential irregularities about the effects of monopsony for nurses. Classic
monopsony describes the situation where an employer derives market power from being the only
employer, or one of very few employers, in the market, making workers inelastic to their
employment opportunities and causing the labor supply curve to slope upward. “New”
monopsony indicates that the labor supply curve could be upward sloping regardless of market
structure and proof of inelastic labor supply need not be the strongest evidence of monopsony in
the market. This is largely due to the fact that workers are relatively inflexible in the short-run to
make changes to their employment. 21 The potential for upward sloping labor supply
independent of market structure is a challenge when testing monopsony theory. Employment
level analyses are a better strategy than wage analyses for capturing long-run effects in the labor
market.22 The employment level analysis I conduct could capture the effect of market
concentration on employment levels in the long-run, when workers are less constrained by the
sunk costs of making changes to employment in the short-run.
Beyond uniqueness to the nature of monopsony in the nursing labor market, another layer
to the discussion is the difference between the urban and rural labor markets, especially in the
industry of healthcare. Facilities that are in remote areas are often designated as Critical Access
Hospitals (CAHs) in order to benefit from increased Medicare and Medicaid support for
communities that would otherwise not have emergency care. The CAH designation helps to
sustain access to care for individuals in sparsely populated regions. Facilities qualify as CAHs if
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Barry Hirsch and Edward Schumacher, “Classic or new monopsony? Searching for evidence in nursing labor
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they have at most 25 beds and are also no less than 35 miles from another facility. 23 From 20112016, over 11% of hospitals in rural areas were involved in a merger, usually due to low
profitability and inability to cover debt. 24
High concentration in rural healthcare labor markets is much more common than in urban
markets, and is usually not a result of anticompetitive practices but instead just a natural result of
the sparse population. Sustaining access to care for remote communities is difficult and
unprofitable; focusing on increasing competition for these facilities is probably not the best
strategy for increasing quality of care.
The association of naturally lower levels of demand for healthcare in sparser localities
with lower levels of employment suggests the same correlation could exist in localities even with
larger populations. While it is entirely possible and likely that employment levels are affected by
market power as a result of increasing industry consolidation, natural changes to the level of
healthcare demand unrelated to market concentration would also affect the level of nurse
employment and suggest potential reverse causality in the relationship between market
concentration and employment levels.
Data Summary
The primary data used for the analysis come from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services’ (CMS) Provider of Services Current Files (POS). The data are self-reported from
healthcare facilities through CMS regional offices. The POS file contains observations that
extensively describe each facility, workers at each facility, the type of care provided, among
other details, from 2011 to 2020. The file is updated quarterly with data from the last month of
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“Critical Access Hospital,” Machine Learning Network, Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (July 2019).
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each quarter, i.e. March for Q1, June for Q2, September for Q3, and December for Q4. Starting
in Q2 of 2011, POS files were extracted from the Quality Improvement Evaluation System
(QIES). Previous data came from the Online Survey Certification & Reporting System
(OSCAR). The POS files are separated into a “CLIA” file and an “OTHER” file for each quarter
of observations. The “CLIA” files include facilities under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments (CLIA) federal standards for health facilities that test human specimens for health
assessment, however do not provide any insight into employment. The “OTHER” files, which
have data including employment information from facilities of eighteen other provider types
(non-CLIA facilities), are used as the data for this analysis.
The POS data are at the facility-level, where facilities are identified by a unique six-digit
CMS Certification number. Each facility lists the average number of employees in each
occupation at the facility at the time of each survey. The location of each facility is identified by
street address, and state and county FIPS codes.
Collecting facilities into their respective commuting zones, I am able to measure
concentration in each regional labor market over time through a Herfindahl-Hirshman Index
(HHI). Commuting zones are localities designated by the United States Department of
Agriculture that are good measures of local economies, instead of the more political boundaries
of counties.25 Commuting zones reflect the range of reasonable transportation within a
community, which make them good definitions of local labor markets because they include all
potential employers within the market. Combining the HHI concentration measure with the
employment data from the POS, I am able to isolate the effect of changing regional market
concentration on the level of employment. Because the analysis is necessarily conducted at the

25

United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, “Commuting Zones and Labor Market
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commuting zone level, USDA commuting zone data is also integral to the project. The most
recent commuting zones defined in 2000 are used. Defining the local labor market at the
commuting zone level also requires that the data are restricted to facilities located in the 50
states, because commuting zones are not defined for U.S. territories.
Early on, an issue was identified of multiple observations in the POS for what appeared
to be a single facility. A lot of effort was put forth to investigate the cause of this issue, and to
find if the multiple observations are in fact duplicates or otherwise. Most interestingly, there are
no duplications of CMS Certification Numbers in the data. Instead, the potential duplicates were
identified by similar facility names and addresses.
The nature of the duplicates is important to the accuracy of the analysis. Facility-level
employment is used to calculate market shares within commuting zones as an input for the HHI.
Knowing if the duplicates are parts of the same facility, different measurements of the same
facility, or direct duplicates is integral to calculating an accurate HHI. The facility-level
duplicates need to be summed, averaged, or simplified such that there is only one observation for
each facility for the calculation. Making an incorrect judgement of the apparent duplicates
would lead to overestimation or underestimation of market concentration.
Insight from a number of different sources offered a solution to the apparent duplicates
issue. First, CMS’s Dovid Chaifetz and Thomas Kress informed that provider numbers from
previously terminated facilities remain in the data. So, apparent duplicate observations are
usually a result of outdated provider numbers that have remained in the dataset. A provider
number that has an associated termination date likely represents a facility that has undergone a
change and, if it is still operating, is doing so under a new provider number. These changes are
commonly due to a merger with another facility or a change of the type of facility, such as

10

designation from critical access to general hospital as a facility and its surrounding population
grows in size.
The out-of-date facilities in the data need to be identified and deleted. The best solution
for this comes from the Quality, Safety, & Oversight Group (QSOG) within CMS. The QSOG
has accessible rosters of CMS Certification Numbers for all active hospitals, in each month of
each year. Because of the lack of accuracy of reporting in the POS, this roster is relied upon as
the most up-to-date record of active facilities in each year of the analysis. Any facility that
appears in the POS but not on the QSOG roster is assumed to be a duplicate observation and is
dropped from the data. There is a small subset of observations that are in the QSOG roster but
not in the POS, and so do not have original employment information. 26 The employment at these
few facilities is imputed as the average level of employment within the respective commuting
zone.
I supplement the POS dataset with US Census data for population controls. Controlling
for commuting zone population and changes in population should separate the effect of demand
shocks from the effect of market concentration on nurse employment. I also use the Census data
to make an urbanicity measure, in order to distinguish between commuting zones based on rural
and urban characteristics, measured by population levels. My urbanicity measure follows similar
methodology as the USDA’s Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (RUCCs), and assigns a commuting
zone to one of five categories of population size. The largest category is Major Metro, with a
minimum population of 5 million residents in the commuting zone. Only the largest 8
commuting zones fill this category: Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Houston, San Francisco,
DC Metro Area, Boston, and NJ. I then categories commuting zones by the size of city. Large

26

About 20-30 facilities, out of almost 5,000, in each year of the analysis are on the QSOG roster of hospitals but
not found in the POS.
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cities are commuting zones with a minimum of 1 million residents, such as Portland, Oregon or
Denver, Colorado. Medium cities have a minimum commuting zone population of 500,000,
such as Knoxville, Tennessee, and small cities have populations over 50,000, such as Santa Fe,
New Mexico. Any commuting zones with less than 50,000 residents are classified as rural.
A part of the RUCCs methodology that my urbanity codes do not use is adjacency. The
RUCCs assign a higher code to a county that has a micropolitan population with an adjacent
metropolitan county, than to a county with a micropolitan population but with no adjacent
metropolitan county. According to RUCCs, adjacency implies that there is meaning to if an area
is micropolitan but with easy transportation to a metropolitan area. 27 My urbanicity measure
does not incorporate adjacency because the labor markets in my analysis are defined at the
commuting zone level, which already includes the limits of reasonable transportation between
adjacent communities.
Past literature uses varying ranges for population thresholds between rural and urban,
which range anywhere between 2,500 and 50,000. 28 I choose the upper estimate of 50,000 as the
maximum population for a rural commuting zone, in an effort to create a larger subset of the data
qualify as rural. This should provide a wider gap between high concentrated markets that are a
result of sparse populations (usually occurring in rural commuting zones) and high concentrated
markets that are anticompetitive. When separating rural and urban commuting zones for
analysis, this will ensure the more dynamic urban markets are distinct from the rural markets.
The analysis aims to capture the effect of market concentration on nurse employment. I
define nurse employment as the number of Registered Nurses employed at hospitals. The data

27

United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, “Rural Urban Continuum Codes” (2021):
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are restricted to facilities defined as hospitals by CMS, which are “institutions(s) primarily
engaged in providing, by or under the supervision of physicians, inpatient diagnostic and
therapeutic services or rehabilitation services.” 29 The hospital facilities in the POS dataset
include short term, long term, psychiatric, rehabilitation, children’s, transplant, and critical
access hospitals. Similarly to defining the commuting zones as the local labor market, defining
the occupation in the market as Registered Nurses employed at hospitals narrows the analysis
and makes the inferences drawn from the results more specific, due to potential differences in
type of work for nurses employed at other facilities, such as schools or public health
departments.
Using the POS dataset for my analysis only provides the opportunity to test the
monopsony hypothesis through employment levels, as there is no information about wages,
benefits, or hours worked in the data. Of course, we know that wage and level of employment
should have a direct relationship in a traditional market model. However, monopsony could
have different effects on level of employment and wages separately, especially through the
sustained effects in the market in the short- and long-runs. Wage analyses are more likely to
capture short-run effects of changes to market concentration while long-run effects are more
apparent in wage levels. 30 Testing the effect of concentration on nurse employment levels is a
unique contribution to the literature rather than the more common wage analyses.
There is still room to investigate how concentration and possible monopsony power
allows employers to exploit workers through other various ways, such as increasing nurse-to-
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patient ratios, having poor or dangerous working conditions, or holding down the number of
hours worked per worker.
Empirics
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index
A prerequisite to measuring the effect of changes to industry organization is to have an
accurate measure of market concentration. A commonly used concentration measure is the
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI). HHI is widely utilized as an index for calculating market
concentration, and is used by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in
reviewing mergers. HHI is often central to the arguments for and against mergers to predict the
effect of such acquisitions on market structure and market power. The 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines state “the higher the post-merger HHI and the increase in the HHI, the greater are the
Agencies’ potential competitive concerns.” 31 The Herfindahl-Hirshman Index is defined as the
sum of the squared market shares of all firms in the market.

𝐻𝐻𝐼 =

𝑠

In order to calculate the index as the definition describes, a number of aspects of the
calculation must be specified. As previously explained, the relevant labor market is for the
analysis defined as the labor market for nurses within a commuting zone (j). Market shares (s)
for each hospital facility (k) are calculated as the number nurses in an occupation (i) at each
facility, such as Registered Nurse or Licensed Practical Nurse, in relation to the total number of

31

Department of Justice, “Horizontal Merger Guidelines” (August 2010): 19.

14

nurses in the commuting zone. Because HHI is constructed in this way, the entirety of the
analysis is conducted at the commuting zone level, although the Provider of Services dataset is
originally at the facility-level.
Table 1
Registered Nurse Labor Market Characteristics for Commuting Zones by Urbanicity in
2019
# of CZs
Average HHI
Median HHI
Avg. Population
All CZs
564
2,067
1,239
576,081
Major Metro
8
316
335
8,563,165
Large City
63
1,189
945
2,234,500
Medium City
65
2,592
2,198
734,016
Small City
362
5,155
4,614
181,579
Rural
66
9,212
10,000
33,150
HHI is calculated with the average RN employment at hospitals in 2019. Population is all persons, adults and
children, within a commuting zone. Calculations are weighted by commuting zone population in 2019.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Provider of Services Current Files. [September, 2020].

Figure 1
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Table 1 describes the nursing labor market at the commuting zone level in 2019, and
Figure 1 represents the median HHI visually. Typically, more populous commuting zones
experience a lower level of market concentration, and rural commuting zones are particularly
15

highly concentrated. The median HHI for rural commuting zones is 10,000, a labor market with
only one employer.
From Table 1, we see that the median HHI measure for nursing labor markets in the US is
about 1,200. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines classify standards for levels of concentration in
a market and standards for changing market concentration, in terms of HHI. Unconcentrated
markets have an HHI measure below 1500, moderately concentrated markets are between 1500
and 2500, and highly concentrated markets are above 2500. From these guidelines, with an HHI
measure of 1200, the average commuting zone in the US has an unconcentrated labor market for
nurses which does not follow the expectation that the healthcare labor market generally has
higher levels of market concentration overall. However, as commuting zone population
decreases, HHI increases. Medium cities, small cities, and rural areas have HHI measures that
indicate highly concentrated markets.
The measurements in both Table 1 and Figure 1 are weighted medians of HHI in an effort
to best represent the labor markets in which most RNs work. My investigation is interested in
how increasing market concentration is affecting nurses. Rural commuting zones with very
highly concentrated markets do not have a large effect on nurse employment because very few
nurses live in these areas. To prevent overstating the impact of rural areas, I down weight very
small, unpopulated yet highly concentrated markets and upweight the more populous commuting
zones to more accurately reflect the nursing population. I weight commuting zones by their
relative populations, using population levels from the US census, all measured in 2011. The
same estimation methodology is applied to the regression models for similar reasons. 32

32

Solon et al., “What Are We Weighting For?” NBER Working Series 18859 (February 2013).

16

The two histograms below, Figures 2 and 3, demonstrate the intuition for weighting.
Figure 2 is the unweighted histogram, showing the distribution of HHI by frequency in
commuting zone, for all 50 states. It appears that most commuting zones fall well above the
standard of 2500 for a highly concentrated market. In fact, the median observation in this figure
is an HHI of 4973. The spike at the high end of the index comes from the frequency of small,
rural commuting zones that have very few or only a single hospital facility. Of the total 710
commuting zones, 126 are rural communities with only a single hospital facility. These 126
rural commuting zones when measured by HHI and compared to the DOJ standards, appear to be
very highly concentrated and of great anticompetitive concern, however a very small portion of
the US population lives in these regions because they are so remote and the high market
concentration is not a result of anticompetitive behavior but instead a natural result of very low
demand for healthcare.
Figure 2

17

Figure 3 is the weighted histogram, and shows the HHI distribution across the population
which more accurately represents the reality of market concentration for the population of
Registered Nurses in the US. The majority of the population lives in commuting zones that have
an HHI measure toward the lower end of the index, and the median individual lives in a
commuting zone with an HHI measure of about 1200, unconcentrated. Half the population lives
in commuting zones below this median measure, in nurse labor markets that are even less
concentrated, and half live in commuting zones with HHI above the median measure, reaching
into moderate- to highly-concentrated nursing labor markets.
Figure 3

I also measure the concentration of nursing employment opportunities across regional
groupings of commuting zones, for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. The median HHI
measures for these subcategories are in Figure 4. There is less variation regionally than across
the urbanicity subcategories of commuting zones. The Northeast has the lowest concentration
and the South the highest.
18

Figure 4
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I also calculate market concentration across different occupations within the broader
umbrella of nursing, displayed in Figure 5. Registered Nurses and Licensed Practical Nurses
have very similar concentrations, however the market for Nurse Practitioners is more
concentrated. Licensed Practical Nurses have fewer qualifications than Registered Nurses, and
require less education. Conversely, Nurse Practitioners require more training and education than
both RNs and LPNs, and hospitals typically employ fewer Nurse Practitioners overall. So, there
are fewer employment opportunities for Nurse Practitioners and their labor market is also more
concentrated.

19

Figure 5
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When measuring pre- and post-merger HHI, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines set
standards of changes in HHI and their effect on market concentration. A small change of less
than 100 does not present any meaningful change to market structure. However, potential
competitive concerns arise from a change in HHI of at least 100, and especially a change in HHI
of 200. From this policy standpoint, I use a change in HHI of 200 as a reasonable treatment
effect to measure the effect on nurse employment from a meaningful change in market structure.
The policy implications from the DOJ’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines are very
informative for analyses of market concentration, however the direct application of them to the
healthcare labor market should be taken lightly. These standards for concentration and changes
of concentration are intended most directly for application in output markets, especially those
affected by horizontal mergers. It is possible that the levels for high concentration, medium
concentration, and unconcentrated markets differ when measured by HHI in a labor market,
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although HHI is still a useful and relevant statistic to measure concentration even in a when
applied outside a traditional output market. 33
Table 2 presents the frequency of a commuting zone experiencing an increase or decrease
in HHI, the average change in HHI respectively, and the associated change in employment.
About half of commuting zones over 2011 to 2019 experienced an increase in market
concentration, however average change in level of employment in these commuting zones was
positive. Monopsony theory would predict as market concentration increases, level of
employment should decrease. The twenty-three commuting zones that experienced a market
consolidation yielding only one employer in the market (HHI of 10,000) do follow that
expectation. The average changes in HHI within the 2011 to 2019 time period are greater than
the DOJ’s policy standpoint 200 HHI, and changes to market concentration closer to 1000 are
not uncommon. I use both 200 and 1000 as treatment effects when drawing inferences from the
model.
Table 2
Non-linear Marginal Effects of Market Concentration and RN Employment, 2011-2019
Change to CZ Market
Average Change in HHI
Average Change in RN
# of CZs
Concentration, by HHI
Employment
Increase
995
295
267
Increase to 10,000
3711
-14
23
Decrease
-721
226
174
Decrease from 10,000
-4355
-2
8
Unchanged
n/a
1
123
Calculations are unweighted. 123 commuting zones did not experience an increase or decrease in HHI, out of the
total 564. RN Employment is measured as number of nurses, not in log form.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Provider of Services Current Files. [September, 2020].
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US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Measuring occupational concentration by industry” (February 2014):
https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-3/measuring-occupational-concentration-by-industry.htm
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Overall, there is a lot of variation in concentration for nursing employment in the hospital
industry across commuting zones with different characteristics such as urbanicity and
regionality. There is generally low to moderate concentration for the majority to the US
population, however remote areas experience very highly concentrated markets, which should be
a natural result of the low demand for health care in sparsely populated localities.
Model
I use a Weighted Least Squares model to estimate the effect of market concentration on
nurse employment. I run four separate regressions, all with the same specifications. First, I
estimate a cross-section regression in the years 2011, 2016, and 2019, separately.
(1) 𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑚𝑝) = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐼 + 𝛽 ln (𝑝𝑜𝑝) + 𝜀
Here, ln(emp)ij is the natural log of the level of employment of occupation (j) in
commuting zone (i). Again, the analysis is focused primarily on the outcomes of Registered
Nurses, but also looks at the markets for Licensed Practical Nurses and Nurse Practitioners for
comparison and a more comprehensive analysis. The parameter of interest is 𝛽 which measures
the effect of market concentration on employment. The natural log of total population in each
commuting zone, popj, is introduced as a control against potential demand shocks, to control for
growing or shrinking populations that would in turn cause an increase or decrease in nurse
employment independently from changes in market structure.
Both the control population variable and dependent employment variable are taken as
natural logs to allow the relationship to be non-linear. The effect can be interpretated as a
percent change of employment from an increase in the market concentration index HHI or a
percent change of population. The parameter 𝛽 will capture the effect on nurse employment
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from the percent change of population in the commuting zone, separate from the effects of
market structure.
The model was checked for robustness by sequentially adding population as a control,
both in the weighted and unweighted models. The weighted model with both HHI and
population as independent variable (specification 4) is the preferred model. The regression is run
within the different urbanicity categories and regional categories to investigate potential
heterogeneous effects across different geographic labor markets.
The control variable ln(pop)j is introduced to separate the effect of demand shocks from
the effect of market concentration on nurse employment. Facilities make employment decisions
in relation to demand, and smaller populations need less medical care. This is an effect on
healthcare employment that would not be captured by regressing HHI directly on level of
employment. Total commuting zone population should be sufficient as a control because the
demand shock would have to be large enough and sustained over time to actually affect nurse
employment. An isolated event, such as a natural disaster, could increase demand for healthcare
services for a limited amount of time, but is unlikely to have a meaningful effect on nurse
employment due to delays and friction in the labor market. A growing, or shrinking, population
would cause a change in demand for healthcare, and subsequently the number of nurses needed
at facilities in that commuting zone, and would be captured with the implemented population
control. A further extension that may be helpful for future investigation is the average age of the
population. An increase in demand for healthcare services would be associated with an aging
population, such as the large and aging baby boomer’s generation. As some commuting zones
experience an aging population relative to other commuting zones with a lower average age,
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their hospitals may need to hire more nurses, an effect uncaptured by total population and market
concentration.
A weighted model is preferred over traditional OLS due to differences in relative sizes of
commuting zones, in terms of population, and the effect of these differences on the analysis.
Many rural communities have highly concentrated labor markets, but also very few residents in
the commuting zones. This causes the analysis to place a lot of importance on these small
commuting zones, and overstates their effect on the total population of nurses. This is visually
very apparent between the weighted and unweighted histograms, Figures 1 and 2.
The decision to weight the analysis was taken with care and informed by the empirical
research on the uses of weighted estimation data. 34 A primary reason in favor of weighting is to
“make the analysis sample representative of the target population,” especially when calculating
descriptive statistics.35 My analysis is conducted at the commuting zone level; however, each
commuting zone does not represent an equal part of the nursing population across the US. I
weight each commuting zone by its population level to avoid overstating the importance of less
populous commuting zones and understating the importance of more populous commuting zones.
Utilizing population weights better supports the main interests of the project, investigating nurse
staffing outcomes, and not just the general distribution of concentration across commuting zones.
The cross-section model is somewhat intentionally weak. It is far more interesting and
statistically convincing to use a first-differenced model. The remaining three regressions are
differenced over the following time periods: 2011-2016, 2016-2019, and 2011-2019. It is very
likely that commuting zones have individual-specific characteristics that influence nursing
employment but are not captured by HHI or population, and are therefore left in the error term in
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Solon et al., “What Are We Weighting For?” NBER Working Series 18859 (February 2013).
Solon et al., “What Are We Weighting For?” NBER Working Series 18859 (February 2013): 22.
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the cross-section regressions. Such fixed effects could include local legislation about staffing
requirements that affects only a subset of commuting zones, or a strong nursing union that is
active in only one region. The commuting zone-specific fixed effects will bias the results of the
cross-section model. By differencing, I drop such characteristics that do not change over time
and can instead isolate how changing market concentration, controlled by changing population,
affects nurse employment.
(2) 𝛥𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑚𝑝) = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝛥𝐻𝐻𝐼 + 𝛽 𝛥ln (𝑝𝑜𝑝) + 𝜀
It is important to note that all independent and dependent variables differenced across the
time period in the first-differenced models, but the commuting zone population weights are
maintained as levels. This follows my initial decision to weight the estimation by relative sizes
of commuting zones, and not by the relative growth of commuting zones which would be the
case if the weight was differenced. The population weights are used from the first year of each
time period to avoid any potential endogeneity within the time period between population level
and nurse employment.
The same subcategories of analysis are used for the first-difference model as in the cross
section; the regressions are run to the different nursing occupations, different levels of urbanicity
in commuting zone, and regionally.
The time periods of the differenced models were chosen with the policy effects of the
Affordable Care Act in mind. The ACA greatly increased the number of insured adults and their
subsequent access to care increased, which was experienced similarly across population groups.
It is estimated that the legislation increased the number of adults with health insurance by 20
million.36
36

Uberoi et al., “Health Insurance Coverage and the Affordable Care Act, 2010-2016,” ASPE Issue Brief (March
2016): 1.
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The ACA was signed into law in March of 2010, and increased in implementation
through early 2016. This immense increase of insured adults potentially had an effect on the
health care industry and relative demand through its rollout, however the effects are not captured
by the HHI or population variables. Instead, to control for the policy effect, the broader time
period of all available data is broken into two shorter time periods, 2011-2016 and 2016-2019,
for robustness checks to accommodate for the policy effects of the ACA.
The same intuition for the population control from the cross-section model is applied to
the differenced model. In the case of the differenced model, the logged population control
captures the effect of changing population, represented in percent.
Differencing excludes commuting zone-specific unobserved heterogeneity and is an
improvement from the cross-section model in that the unobservables that can bias the results are
dropped. While the first-difference model is an improvement on the cross-section model, it does
not address potential reverse causality in the effect of market structure and level of employment.
Intuitively, larger populations need more healthcare than smaller populations. So, as a
population naturally grows or shrinks in terms of population, the nursing workforce will follow
the same pattern of growth.
As a population decreases and their hospital industry naturally decreases and
consolidates, the model would represent this as a decrease in level of employment due to the
increasing market concentration. The lowering level of employment in this situation would not
be a result of anticompetitive market power. This is a natural correlation between demand for
healthcare and population, violating assumptions of strict exogeneity between independent
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variables required for a differenced model. The first-difference model yields better results than
the cross-section model, but is still victim to potential bias and reverse causality. 37
A lag in time between changes to market structure and the effect on employment forces
the model to measure the employment effect as a result of changes to market structure.
Specifying subsequent time periods for the independent and dependent variables isolates the
effect to be measured within a specific time as a result of a change during a previous time
period.38
(3) 𝛥𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑚𝑝)

,

= 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝛥𝐻𝐻𝐼

,

+ 𝛽 𝛥ln (𝑝𝑜𝑝)

,

+𝜀

The lagged first-difference model uses the same variable specification as both the crosssection and first-difference models. The crucial difference is in the time period in which HHI is
measured and the time period in which nurse employment is measured, which only require
exogeneity between the subsequent time periods for unbiased estimates. I limit the HHI
measurement to the first period available in the data, from 2011 to 2016, again to be sensitive to
the rollout of the Affordable Care Act. Nurse employment is measured across the entire time
period of data available, from 2011 to 2019. This lag forces the model to measure the effect of
changes in market concentration from 2011-2016 on nurse employment from 2011-2019
captured in 𝛽 , separate from demand shock effects.
Results
The results of the cross-section regression with the preferred specification can be found
in column (4) of Table 3. Columns (1) through (3) show the results from the regressions
comparing the effects when weighted or unweighted, and with and without the population
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Leszczensky et al., “How to Deal with Reverse Causality Using Panel Data? Recommendations for Researchers
Based on a Simulation Study,” Sociological Methods & Research 29, 1 (2019): 11.
38
Leszczensky et al., “How to Deal with Reverse Causality Using Panel Data? Recommendations for Researchers
Based on a Simulation Study,” Sociological Methods & Research 29, 1 (2019): 11.
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control. In general, the coefficients are relatively large with small standard errors and are
typically statistically significant at least at the .01 level.
Table 3
Effect of Market Concentration on Registered Nurse Employment in 2019
log(RN employment)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

2019
HHI

OLS

WLS

OLS

WLS

-0.000408***
(1.43e-05)

-0.000561***
(3.90e-05)

8.492***
(0.0833)

9.690***
(0.163)

-5.96e-05***
(1.97e-05)
1.041***
(0.0410)
-6.165***
(0.591)

-6.13e-05*
(3.49e-05)
0.955***
(0.0503)
-5.020***
(0.771)

log(population)
Constant

Observations
562
562
562
562
R-squared
0.601
0.666
0.848
0.909
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Analytical weights are commuting zone
populations in 2019. Effect is measured at the commuting zone observation level.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Provider of Services Current Files. [September, 2020].

Following the DOJ’s policy that a 200 increase in HHI raises competitive concerns, a
treatment effect of 200 points in this model predicts an 1.23% decrease in employment. The
effect is magnified with an even greater change to market structure, such as an increase in 1000
points. A 1000 difference in HHI would indicate a decrease in nurse employment by 6.13% in
the higher concentrated market. Between two commuting zones with a difference in market
concentration of 1000 points in HHI, the more concentrated market would have 6% less nurses,
all else constant- a pretty stark difference.
Table 4
Employment Effects from Market Changes in 2019
Change in HHI
RN employment effect39
200
-1.23%
1000
-6.13%
Effects are statistically significant at the ***p<.01 level, measured at
the commuting-zone observation level.

39

A one-unit increase in HHI increases the dependent variable by 100*[exp(beta)-1] percent.
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These results are very much in line with classic monopsony theory; as market
concentration increases, employers gain monopsony power and are able to decrease the level of
employment in the market. This model would be very appealing to opponents of hospital
mergers, and appears to be strong evidence for the presence of monopsony power in the nursing
labor market and market power for employers to decrease the level of employment of nurses.
Like previously stated, a first-difference model offers a stronger statistical opportunity to
investigate how changes in market concentration affect employment. Again, I stress how
differencing drops any commuting-zone specific characteristics that are not controlled for in the
model but potentially affect nurse employment. The first-difference model should eliminate
concerns of bias from violation of strict endogeneity between the independent variables.
The differenced model was conducted over the longest time period available, 2011
through 2019, to more broadly capture changes to industry organization and the effect on
employment, especially as hospital mergers may take a few years to be fully realized, as well as
to avoid potential autocorrelation. The results of the differenced model can be found in Table 5.
Table 5
Effect of Changing Market Concentration on Registered Nurse Employment from
2011 to 2019
2011-2019
Δ log(RN employment)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
ΔHHI

OLS

WLS

OLS

WLS

-4.45e-06
(3.30e-05)

1.77e-05
(8.89e-05)

0.0563***
(0.0217)

0.106***
(0.0213)

-2.24e-06
(3.31e-05)
3.90e-07***
(9.73e-08)
0.0441*
(0.0232)

2.61e-05
(8.95e-05)
2.81e-07***
(5.80e-08)
0.0563***
(0.0203)

Δ log(population)
Constant

Observations
562
562
562
562
R-squared
0.000
0.001
0.006
0.035
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Analytical weights are commuting
zone populations in 2011. Effect is measured at the commuting zone observation level.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Provider of Services Current Files. [September, 2020].
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The differenced model predicts that an increase in market concentration of 200 points in
HHI would in fact not decrease nurse employment, as is the expectation of monopsony theory
and the prediction from the cross-section model. The baseline effect from the differenced
models predicts a small, yet positive effect on employment, although statistically insignificant.
The small positive effect is at odds with my hypothesis and traditional monopsony theory,
however because the findings are not statistically significant, the inferences drawn from them
should be limited.
Table 6
Employment Effects from Market Changes from 2011
to 2019
Change in HHI
RN employment effect40
200
0.52%
1000
2.61%
Effects are statistically insignificant, measured at the commuting-zone
observation level.

The confidence interval of 95% outlines the limits of the largest potential effect within
the statistical interval. Following a 200-point change in HHI, the confidence interval from the
first-difference model predicts the largest possible effect to be increasing RN employment by
4.04% and the smallest to be decreasing RN employment by -3%. Both of these possibilities
would be significant effects in the labor market by either increasing or decreasing the number of
nurses, and very noticeable by the workforce of nurses and patients alike. Either of these
possibilities would have an impact on the quality of care provided to patients.
The wide confidence interval also includes a reasonable effect. The lower limit of -3%
outlined by the confidence interval could mean monopsony power in the market is holding nurse
employment down, which is in line with my initial hypothesis. However, the wide interval

40

A one-unit increase in HHI increases the dependent variable by 100*[exp(beta)-1] percent.
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includes an even larger positive possible effect of 4% and neither effect can be statistically
distinguished from the possible zero effect. Because the model predicts very small coefficients
that are within a very large confidence interval including zero, the model’s estimates are “noisy”
zeros. The small yet positive coefficients may appear as evidence against the presence of
monopsony, but the conclusions that can be drawn are weak in their interpretation.
The time period of 2011-2019 of the first-difference model is split into two smaller
sections, before and after 2016, in order to control for potential policy effects of the Affordable
Care Act through increased demand following the increase of 20 million newly insured adults.
The coefficient in the second period, 2016-2019, is significantly larger than both the first period,
2011-2016, and the overall period 2011-19. These are displayed in Table 7. The larger estimate
follows the intuition from the proposed increase in demand from the ACA, however the effect is
somewhat unbelievably large. The effect is measured in the smallest time period of the
differenced models and is possibly too short for the differenced model to accurately represent the
effect.
It is unclear why the estimated effect is so much larger in the period 2016-2019. It is
possible the time period specifications around 2016 are not enough to control for the
implementation of the ACA, or that the real effect of the new legislation is affecting the market
differently than as a demand shock as I predict. Beyond increasing demand for healthcare by
greatly increasing the number of insured adults, the ACA could have had an effect on how
hospitals approach the hiring and firing of their staff. Another potential influence in this period
is the slow and prolonged economic recovery that started in 2011 following the crash in 2008.
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Table 7
Time Period Comparisons of the Effect of Changing Market Concentration on
Registered Nurse Employment from 2011 to 2019
2011-2019
Δ log(RN employment)
(1)
(2)
(3)
ΔHHI
Δ log(population)
Constant

2011-2016

2016-2019

2011-2019

1.98e-05
(4.97e-05)
2.57e-07***
(6.81e-08)
0.0708***
(0.0156)

7.34e-05
(0.000169)
2.84e-07
(2.02e-07)
-0.0158
(0.0200)

2.61e-05
(8.95e-05)
2.81e-07***
(5.80e-08)
0.0563***
(0.0203)

Observations
569
561
562
R-squared
0.030
0.022
0.035
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Analytical weights: commuting zone
population in 2011. Effect is measured at the commuting zone observation level.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Provider of Services Current Files. [September, 2020].

The analysis is also conducted over additional subcategories to control for differences in
the effect across different labor markets. Figure 6 below shows the visual comparison of effects
as predicted by the first-difference model with a 200 HHI treatment effect across different
urbanicities of commuting zones.
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Figure 6

Concentration Effect on Employment 2011-2019
First-Difference
(Statistically Insignificant)

6.00%

RN Employment Effect,
from ΔHHI of 200

4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
-2.00%
-4.00%
-6.00%
-8.00%
-10.00%
Overall

Major Metro,
Large City

Medium City

Small City

Rural

Commuting zones classified as Major Metro are combined with Large City because the
eight commuting zones that qualify as Major Metro make too small a sample size for an
individual regression. Combining the two categories should not be problematic because both
categories have very large populations, all over 1 million, and low HHI measures, shown in
Figure 1.
There is obviously a lot of variation in the effect across the urbanicity categories. Major
Metro and Large City have a very negative coefficient; however, all the results of the firstdifference model are statistically insignificant. The difference in effect across the markets with
some experiencing a negative predicted effect means some markets could be experiencing effects
in line with the prediction, however not in every market. There is also not an obvious connection
between size of population and the predicted effect, as both the largest, least concentrated
markets and the smallest, most concentrated markets both have a negative effect while the
markets not on the extreme ends of the urbanicity categories have positive effects.
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The first-difference model is also conducted across regional categories. Predicted effects
following a change in HHI of 200 are displayed in Figure 7. There was less variation in HHI
measures across the regional categories, seen in Figure 4, so it is interesting that the FD still
predicts heterogeneous effects. There are likely more unique conditions across different
commuting zones and across time that are not captured by the model. The Midwest is the only
category with a negative effect, and the positive effects in the Northeast, South, and West vary
greatly in their magnitude. Again, these results are statistically insignificant.
Figure 7

Concentration Effect on Employment 2011-2019
First-Difference
(Statistically Insignificant)

4.00%

RN Employment Effect,
from ΔHHI of 200

3.50%
3.00%
2.50%
2.00%
1.50%
1.00%
0.50%
0.00%
-0.50%
-1.00%

Overall

Northeast

Midwest
West

South

The first-difference model was also conducted using different nursing occupations to
measure the concentration of employment opportunities, for Registered Nurses, Licensed
Practical Nurses, and Nurse Practitioners. The main similarity across all the different
subcategories of analysis is that there is wide variation of the predicted effects. The effects are
positive for both RNs and LPNs, however negative and very close to zero for Nurse
Practitioners.
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Figure 8

Concentration Effect on Employment 2011-2019
First-Difference
(Statistically Insignificant)

4.00%

RN Employment Effect,
from ΔHHI of 200

3.50%
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2.00%
1.50%
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0.50%
0.00%
-0.50%

RN
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The first-difference model addresses unobserved commuting zone characteristics
affecting nurse employment by dropping the time-invariant fixed effects. While the firstdifference model is an improvement from the cross-section model, it does not address potential
reverse causality between the effect of market structure and level of employment. The lagged
first-difference model isolates the effect on nurse employment from 2011 to 2019 from changes
in market concentration in 2011 to 2016. The lagged model results are in Table 9, with the same
variable specification as both the cross-sections and first-difference model.
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Table 8
Lagged Effect of Changing Market Concentration in 2011-16 on Registered Nurse
Employment from 2011-19
Δ log(RN employment)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
ΔHHI 2011-16
Δ log(population)
2011-19
Constant

OLS

WLS

OLS

WLS

-4.33e-05
(2.71e-05)

-1.76e-05
(4.88e-05)

0.0610***
(0.0207)

0.108***
(0.0237)

-3.93e-05
(2.71e-05)
1.014***
(0.290)
0.0417**
(0.0209)

-4.64e-06
(4.90e-05)
0.933***
(0.255)
0.0604**
(0.0248)

Observations
562
562
562
562
R-squared
0.009
0.001
0.024
0.024
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Analytical weights are commuting
zone populations in 2011. Effect is measured at the commuting zone observation level.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Provider of Services Current Files. [September, 2020].

An increase in market concentration in the first period is predicted to have a negative
effect on nurse employment overall, although the prediction is still statistically insignificant.
The negative predicted effect is in line with my original hypothesis and monopsony theory. The
lagged model also experiences a similar wide confidence interval as the first differenced model.
With the intuition that the lagged model better accounts for bias and reverse causality, the
negative effects are another piece of evidence pointing toward increasing market concentration
lowering nurse employment levels, however weak due to the statistically significance and wide
confidence intervals. The RN employment effects, following the same treatment effects of a
change in HHI, are in Table 9. The effects from the lagged model are smaller in magnitude than
the first-difference model.
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Table 9
Lagged Employment Effects in 2011-19 from Market
Changes from 2011-16
Change in HHI
RN employment effect41
-0.09%
200
-0.46%
1000
Effects are statistically insignificant, measured at the commuting-zone
observation level.

Conclusion
From the specific characteristics of the nursing labor market, the occupation provides a
good opportunity to examine the effects of mergers and increasing industry consolidation, and to
test the monopsony hypothesis. Overall, I find a statistically insignificant effect of changing
market concentration on nurse employment. I find wide variation in market concentration and
employment effects across different commuting zones. The variation and difference in results
indicates the market and its imperfections may not be as straight forward as it might first appear.
Pooling all commuting zones together, labor market employment opportunities for nurses
at hospitals are moderately to minimally concentrated. Filtering commuting zones by level of
population and urbanicity reveals a natural relationship that as population increases, market
concentration decreases. Regional groupings of commuting zones have less variation and are
fairly similar in the levels of concentration for employment opportunities. Within the general
nursing occupation, Registered Nurses and Licensed Practical Nurses face similar market
concentrations while Nurse Practitioners experience a more concentrated market.
The cross-section model findings indicate that a higher level of market concentration
does cause lower levels of employment, even when controlling for population demand shocks,

41

A one-unit increase in HHI increases the dependent variable by 100*[exp(beta)-1] percent.
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and is held with statistical significance, although we know the results are most likely biased due
to unobserved fixed effects.
Contrastingly, the first-difference models indicate that the change in HHI in fact does not
have a negative effect. The statistical insignificance of the differenced models warrants caution
when drawing conclusions from these findings. Although the predicted coefficients are very
close to zero, the confidence interval includes an effect in line with my initial hypothesis, that in
response to a moderate change in market structure, nurse employment could decrease by up to 3%. These weaker zeros in the differenced regressions appear to be evidence, though
inconclusive, against the presence of monopsony power in the nursing labor market. The
evidence is further weakened by the large confidence intervals and noisy zeros, which makes the
possible reasonable effect statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Further addressing endogeneity and bias, the lagged first-difference model isolates the
effect on nurse employment from a change to market concentration within a prior fixed time
period. Necessarily requiring the effect to be measured sequentially combats potential reverse
causality in the relationship between market structure and the level of employment. The lagged
model yields negative estimates, however also statistically significant with wide confidence
intervals as in the original first-difference model. The lagged model has the strongest statistical
intuition for measuring changes to nurse employment from a change in market concentration,
and is in line with my initial hypothesis with negative estimates, however does not provide
compelling support for the conclusion because it is statistically indistinguishable from zero and
so the true effect is still ambiguous.
There are many potential reasons behind the statistical insignificance of the results. A
strong assumption in my analysis restricts the RN labor market to include only hospitals. In
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reality, nurses have more mobility to choose between other employment options such as nursing
homes, home health agencies, doctor’s offices, schools, or different occupations altogether. It is
reasonable to restrict the analysis to hospitals as the main employment of Registered Nurses at
60% of the market, to have specificity for the implication for nursing employment only at
hospitals, but hospitals will still face competition from the remaining 40% of the market.
Assuming hospitals are the sole employers of nurses in the labor market ignores the pressure on
wages and employment level from the remaining potential employers in the commuting zone.
This assumption possibly causes the analysis to be less accurate leading to statistical
insignificance and noisy zeros. Further research should consider the possibility of widening the
defined market to include nursing homes and other employment opportunities for Registered
Nurses, which may be a more realistic representation of the nursing labor market.
The POS data used here only contain averages of nurse employment at hospitals, and the
results from the model using this data are weak. A more precise measurement of employment
could include number of hours worked. The active facilities in the CMS POS data need to be
verified with an outside source to identify outdated facilities in the data. This begs the question
of sampling error in the data, if the employment statistics in the POS data are truly reflective of
the reality of nurse employment over the time period of analysis. Recreating the HHI with a
different measure of employment could improve the strength of the measure of market
concentration. Improving the employment measure would provide a stronger foundation of HHI
to study the effect on nurses.
The wide variation of the effect across different commuting zones reveals how markets
are influenced by constraints that are probably unique and specific to each commuting zone, and
are uncaptured in the data. Some commuting zones may be more vulnerable to bias and reverse
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causality than others. Some commuting zones may have the specific conditions such that the
market is decreasing in competition anticompetitively, and employers use this situation to exploit
nurses by lower levels of employment. Without an identifiable distinguishing factor between
these commuting zones, the effect I predict could be occurring in some commuting zones but is
inseparable in the data from commuting zones without anticompetitive concerns.
The result of the analysis does not follow expectations of a traditional monopsony model,
and is at odds with my initial hypothesis. There would be value in future research that
investigates why the results deviate from the prediction and theory. Future work should
investigate other outlets for the effects of high or increasing concentration in the nursing labor
market. Such other outlets could include changes to nurse-to-patient ratios, meaning employers
increase the work load per nurse during shifts, requiring more productivity from each of their
workers. Facing inelastic labor supply, a monopsonist could also choose to manifest their market
power by lowering the quality of working environment for the nurses, which is an outlet of
market power uncaptured by wage or level of employment analyses, but a potential effect of
monopsony nonetheless. Lowering the number of hours worked per nurse and decreasing
benefits are also other potential outcomes of the presence of monopsony in the labor market.
Measuring healthcare employment opportunities in the U.S. geographic labor markets, I
find the nursing labor market to be moderately to minimally concentrated. However, increasing
concentration is not predicted to have a meaningfully negative impact on nursing employment.
In fact, the models predict heterogeneous effects, some positive and others negative, with noisy
zero estimates and statistical insignificance. There is value in future work to strengthen these
results in order to confirm the presence of market power in healthcare labor markets and specify
how the potential market power affects nurse employment.
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